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Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 8)

Ref

6-6-1

4/1

The Konoye Cabinet, seeking to limit the scope of the affair, endeavoured to reach a settlement with the Provincial Government at Peking.

EXCERPT TAKEN FROM "BEHIND THE JAPANESE MASK" BY RT. HON. SIR ROBERT CRAIGIE, page 40

0 164 0002 13 13

Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 9)

Rejected 200 205/8
6-8-1 4/1

The Chinese National Government at that time (1937) possessed a strong and well-balanced army trained by German instructors, advised by a German General and commanded by one of the finest Statesmen-Generals whom China has ever produced -- Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The control latterly exercised by the Central Government over the Provincial Government at Peking had been somewhat tenuous, for the latter possessed its own army, collected its own taxes and was inclined to resent interference from the South.

EXCERPT TAKEN FROM "BEHIND THE
JAPANESE MASK" BY RT. HON. SIR
ROBERT CRAIGIE, page 40

辯護圖書類第五〇二號（拔粹第九）

當時（一九三七年）中華民國國民政府ハ獨逸人ニヨリ訓練サレタル強ク且整備サレタル軍隊ヲ有シ、ソレハ某獨逸將軍ヲ顧問格ニ、支那古今ヲ通ジテノ名政治家デアリ武將デモアル蔣介石元帥ニヨリ統御サレテキタ。近來中央政府ノ北京地方政府ニ對スル支配力ハドチラカト云ヘバ、稍薄弱デアツタ。トイフノハ、後者モ亦自身ノ軍隊及徵稅權ヲ有シ、トカク、南方ノ干涉ヲ大イニ快カラズ思ツテキタカラデアル。

ロバート・クレイギー卿著

「日本人ノ假面ノ背後ニアルモノ」ヨリノ拔粹（四〇頁）

8 164 00002 13 15

not used

Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 13)

Meantime the moderate leaders both in and out of the Cabinet had been viewing with growing concern the steadily increasing scope of Japan's operations in China. With Mr. Hirota and with other leading Japanese I had private and unofficial talks during October and November, 1937, in regard to the possibility of terminating the hostilities in China. Apart from the Army there was little enthusiasm in Japan for this "Incident" which was now assuming such large proportions. The nibbling off of a few Northern Provinces would have been one thing, but this full-scale war with the Central Government of China was quite another. The outlook filled many a Japanese leader with foreboding. The longer the struggle continued, the more Japanese lives were lost; the further the Japanese Army penetrated into China, the more difficult it must become for Japan to find any way of extricating herself from the imbroglio.

But in those early days it was not unreasonable to hope that Japan might be prepared to cut her losses in an unpopular war in return for some face-saving arrangement for collaboration against "Communism" -- an obligation into which the Chinese Government would put just as much or just as little soul as they wished. At that time the withdrawal of Japanese troops to the positions occupied before the clash at the Marco Polo bridge was seriously considered. But as usual, the military extremists succeeded in blocking any reasonable proposals and the utmost they would contemplate was withdrawal by stages. As the length of each stage was left unspecified, and was to depend on a number of vague conditions, the proposals which finally emerged from the discussions were not such as would interest the Chinese National Government. There was nothing official about these conversations, but they did at least indicate to me that, had it not been for army intransigence, a war which was to run into its ninth year could have been terminated in its fourth month. While officially Japan was not prepared to accept foreign mediation, unofficially I was frequently asked for my help and advice in finding a solution.

Thus in the autumn of 1937 the more far-sighted of Japan's leaders were genuinely seeking a solution acceptable to China, and it was a real tragedy that in the upshot they were unable to offer terms guaranteeing unequivocally the restoration of China's independence and territorial integrity.

EXCERPT TAKEN FROM MEMOIR OF THE
JAPANESE TASK BY LT. HON. SIR
ROBERT GRAIGIE, pages 50-51

Defense document No. 502
(Excerpt 29)

CHAPTER XIII

TIENTSIN

(1939 - 1940)

not used

While Japanese policy had thus been revolving around the question of a "strengthening" of the Anti-Comintern Pact right up to the moment of its destruction by its unnatural parent, Anglo-Japanese relations had been subjected to a strain more severe at any time since my arrival in Japan.

EXCERPT TAKEN FROM "BEHIND THE
JAPANESE MASK" BY RT.HON. SIR
HOMER CRAIGIE, p.72

not used

第十三章 天 津

(一九三九—一九四〇年)

斯の如く日本の政策は防共協定がその不自然な生みの親によつて構成
させらるゝ直前まで、防共協定強化問題を中心として動いてゐたがその
間、日英間の關係は、私の渡日以來かつてなかつた厳しい緊張に包まれ
てゐた

ロバート・クレイジー卿著「日本のマヌーの地」
より抜粋 七二頁

日清文書五〇五號

(按華十三)

一方では政府内外に於ける管理中の懸念は支那に於ける日本の作
業範圍が益々大なるのを見て憂色頗々加はつて居た、自分は一九
三七年十月と十一月中に支那に於ける國事を終結せしむる可能態に關
して廣田君及び他の日本指導者、私的の非公式會談を幾回か
陸軍は別として今や斯くも一大一途をたどりつつある此「事變」に對
する國民の熱意は左様でもなかつた。北京に於ける二三の州を統制
するだけであつたなら寧ろかくとしても中央政府との此大仕掛けの
競争となつては既に全く別である。多くの日本指導者は前途を眺めて
は只々一盞の曙光を感じて居た。國事が進むほど日本人の生命
が失なはれ、日本陸軍が支那内部に侵入すれば寧ろほど日本に對
つては此紛糾から已れを望むための無益かの方法を見出す事が
益々遠くなつて来るに違いない
併し當初においては日本は支那政府が多かれ少かれ兎も何何かの協定
を示すであらう一つの忠告であるところの反協同工作を繼續し乍ら
此に依つて其首子を立て度ほし其の代りに一方人氣のない競争を止め
て競争を無くさうとする用意が日本にあり得たかも知れないと云ふ事

Def Don 0503

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7d7ca6>.

not used

Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 35)

The strength of isolationist opinion in the United States unfortunately rendered impracticable that full Anglo-American collaboration in the formulation and execution of Far Eastern policy which might have proved so helpful at that earlier stage -- particularly at the time of the Tientsin and Burma Road controversies. Japan was playing throughout a game of power politics and it is arguable that a greater and earlier display in the Pacific of Anglo-American force and Anglo-American political collaboration might have acted as a deterrent before the Japanese became hopelessly crumpled in the Nazi net. But such joint action, involving a certain degree of mutual responsibility to resist an armed attack, would have been contrary to the fundamental American policy of avoiding foreign commitments; no American administration, however friendly, could have ignored this rule in the shaping of its Far Eastern policy. But within the limits permissible there were frequent exchanges of view between London and Washington. In practice, British and American Far Eastern policies, although unco-ordinated, followed parallel lines.

During my time in Japan I had as my American colleague Mr. Joseph C. Grew, who had been in Japan since 1932. Throughout the years preceding the outbreak of war with Japan we remained in the closest personal and official touch -- a relationship which I hope may have contributed in some measure to maintain that "parallelism" in British and American policy of which I have spoken. I should like here to pay a tribute to Mr. Grew's steady co-operation in all such matters, despite the many efforts that were made -- sometimes in unexpected quarters -- to sow discord in Anglo-American relations. He never wavered in his conviction that the British Commonwealth would ultimately emerge victorious from its struggle with Germany.

I should also like to pay a tribute to the close co-operation and invaluable assistance which I always received in Tokyo from the naval staff of the American Embassy. In good times and bad, serenely indifferent to the waves of isolationism which passed periodically over the United States, Captain (now Admiral) Harold H. Benus and his successor Commander (now Captain) Henri H. Smith-Hutton, remained staunch believers in the allied cause.

Defense Document No. 502

(Excerpt 35 - continued)

For a time the United States Government, like the British Government, contented themselves with a long series of protests, while the Japanese forces in China piled one affront upon another in their treatment of foreign interests. Late in the summer of 1939, however, the United States Government decided that more drastic action was called for and they denounced the American-Japanese Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, thus freeing their hands for the later imposition of economic retaliatory measures against Japan. The period of notice of termination under the Treaty being six months, Japan was in effect given that time in which to modify her treatment of American rights and interests in the Far East or take the economic consequences.

This sudden stroke came as a considerable shock to the Japanese nation. What was the use of a policy of blandishment towards the great American Republic if Japan's verbal efforts were to be repaid like this? It did not seem to dawn on the Japanese -- or at all events not on the Japanese Press -- that fair words, unsupported by deeds, would not alter the course of American policy. This is not surprising if it is remembered that the Japanese people as a whole had little conception of the arbitrary and indeed brutal treatment to which foreign interests in China had been subjected since July, 1937. To the nation as a whole the denunciation of the Treaty appeared merely unfair and provocative. To the business men and industrialists, with their better knowledge of events in China and their great stake in American-Japanese trade, the news came as a warning that a new agreement, based on a better treatment of American interests, must be negotiated at all costs. But to the Army and the "renovationists" generally, the new move appeared in a different light. These circles had for long resented Japanese economic dependence on the Anglo-Saxon Powers and had been preaching the doctrine of economic self-sufficiency. To them the American action was not a signal for recantation but rather a spur to greater activity in the establishment of Japanese economic hegemony throughout the Far East.

At the outset it was the world of commerce which had its way. Frantic efforts were made by the Japanese Government to conclude a new treaty or at least a *modus vivendi* as a means of averting this dire threat to Japanese trade. But the United States Government were in no mood to content themselves with the repetition of the verbal assurances which had proved so worthless in the past. On its side the Japanese Army was in no mood to show by concrete acts that the era of depredation and confiscation in China had come to an end. So the six months passed and the two countries entered the rarefied and dangerous atmosphere of the treatyless period. It was to last for nearly two years -- until Pearl Harbour.

PURL: <http://www.legal-tools.org/doc/7d7ca>

Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 35 - continued)

At first, when the Treaty expired, nothing untoward occurred. Business proceeded much as before. But the writing was on the wall. Japanese business interests in the United States and American interests in Japan began to reduce their commitments to a minimum and to prepare for the catastrophe which seemed to be impending.

American opinion had been particularly incensed by the continual bombing throughout free China of numerous religious missions marked with the American flag and it was typical of the attitude of the Japanese Army that, much to the chagrin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, these senseless bombings continued throughout the six months' period for the negotiation of a new commercial treaty. According to figures published at the time the United States Government had addressed to the Japanese Government some 362 written representations, of which 256 had not even been acknowledged, and the United States Government might well ask what inducement there could be for the renewal of official commercial relations with a country which treated its diplomatic representations so cavalierly. They rightly demanded concrete evidence of a change of heart before they would even consider the negotiation of a new treaty. A significant commentary on the whole situation was a report appearing in the Press of October, 1939, that 31 American warships had left San Diego for Pearl Harbour and would form part of a permanent reinforcement of the latter naval base.

Relations continued on the same uneasy footing until the autumn of 1940. There were still many indications that the last thing the Japanese nation desired was to become involved in a war with the United States and that the Japanese Navy, on which the main brunt of fighting such a war would fall, was opposed to carrying matters with too high a hand.

EXCERPT TAKEN FROM "BEHIND THE
JAPANESE MASK," BY RT. HON. SIR
ROBERT CRAIGIE, pages 99-101

not used

36

Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 37)

MIYAGAWA'S VIEW
(July, 1940--July, 1941)

During the months immediately following the fall of France the keynote of Japanese extremist policy was indignation against the governing classes, who were accused of having completely misjudged the development of the world situation. Those leaders who had consistently favoured the Rome-Berlin Axis were held to have been impressively justified. The cry went up that the opportunity of a century for the advancement of Japan's destinies must not be missed. The freeing of Japan from economic dependence on the British Empire and the United States was loudly demanded.

With France out of the war and with Britain, virtually disarmed after Dunkirk, battling alone against the mighty Nazi war machine, the democratic system of government was already regarded as condemned at the bar of history on charges of inefficiency and betrayal of the national interest. There could no longer be any place in the Japanese polity for any such system of government. Liberalism and individualism now became terms of opprobrium. This effect of the French collapse on the trend of Japanese internal policy is sometimes overlooked; but in point of fact the disasters of June, 1940, undoubtedly did more than anything else to fasten totalitarianism on the Japanese back. Henceforth Japan was to succumb to a form of fascism adapted to suit the peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of Japanese political psychology.

As leader of this national renovation movement the country again had recourse to Prince Konoye, that dilettante theorist who on earlier occasions had shown such skill in riding the storm. After lengthy confabulations the Prince formed, towards the end of July, a cabinet of pro-Axis leanings. Japan had been brought to a position broadly corresponding to that of Italy on the outbreak of the European war and the transition from "non-involvement" to "non-belligerency" was quickly completed. As ever, the Army was reluctant to assume open and direct responsibility for the shaping of policy but its influence in the new Cabinet was predominant--more so than at any time since my arrival in Japan.

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Defense Document No. 502

(Excerpt 37 - continued)

In internal politics the first task of the new government was to hasten Japan's transition into a fully organized totalitarian state. Since the outbreak of hostilities with China, the main weakness in Japan's internal structure had been the disinclination of the mass of the people to respond wholeheartedly to state control in the economic field. This in turn had been largely due to lack of popular support for the successive authoritarian governments which had held office since my arrival in Japan. The problem before the new Cabinet was how to induce trade, industry and the general public not only to conform to, but enthusiastically to support, the measures necessary to equip Japan for war on the largest scale. On the one hand stood that section of extremists whose slavish admiration of Nazi methods led them to advocate the introduction of the single-party system which, after the German manner, could bully, dragoon and regiment the population into subservience. Amongst the advocates of this course were to be found, rather surprisingly, many of the members of the former parliamentary parties--which had recently voted themselves out of existence in order to conform, as they said, to the spirit of the "new structure movement." For politicians the choice was now either total eclipse or continuation as members of a single party. Some even of the most respected parliamentary leaders chose the latter course.

Ranged against the conception of a single party there stood not only the conservative and moderate elements but, what was more important, the forces of Japanese traditionalism. At all costs the prerogatives of the Emperor, as the theoretical repository of all political power, must be preserved. Furthermore the German conception of the concentration camp, with its corollary of death for every prominent opponent, made little appeal to the Japanese mind. Leaving out of account the army and the Gendarmes, the Japanese preference is usually for persuasion as opposed to coercion. Compromise plays almost as important a part in Japanese internal affairs as it does in our own. Where persuasion fails, recourse is had to more subtle methods than the swinging of the bludgeon and the crack of the whip; for the more highly placed there is, for instance, the perennial threat of the assassin's knife; for the less exalted there is the menace of a peering, ubiquitous, frightening police force. But such methods of open intimidation are only incidental to the normal process of compromise for the settlement of political differences and do not constitute the main instrument of government as was the case with Nazi Germany.

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Defense Document No. 502

(Excerpt 37 - continued) *

With these things in mind Prince Konoyo and his advisors founded a movement with vast ramifications, known as an "Association for Assistance to the Throne." The very name indicates that the primary purpose was the preservation of the Imperial prerogative, the theory being that the whole population should unite in assisting the Emperor to transform the country into a powerful "Defence State." The Association's functions were declared to be twofold; firstly to make known the Government's policies to the public and to secure popular cooperation in their execution; and secondly to transmit to the Government the wishes of the people and to advise the administration on questions of policy. These functions are such as would normally be fulfilled by the Diet; but, parliamentary institutions being by then discredited in Japan, something more "modern" had to be devised. As a sop to the House of Representatives, a "Diet Bureau" was to be included amongst the labyrinth of bureaux and sections into which the new association was subdivided.

Theoretically all sections of Japanese opinion were to be represented in the association and every Japanese peasant or labourer who cared -- and dared -- to do so could express his opinion through the proper channels to its governing body. In practice however most of its key posts fell at the outset into the hands of the worst type of Japanese politician -- the jingo demagogue who, through a ranting championship of the Axis and everything it stood for, had acquired a considerable body of support among the younger generation of Japanese.

With a man of Prince Konoyo's astuteness, it is difficult to say how far this debasement of the political currency was the Prime Minister's misfortune and how far it was his deliberate intention to clip the wings of his more dangerous opponents by including them in this particular section of Japan's new structure. One ground of criticism at the time was that the Prime Minister became ex-officio President of an Association which, in theory, embraced the whole nation. In other words he was assuming a role of combined governmental and extra-governmental leadership, which was held by some to be a violation of the principles of the constitution. Thus the new* association did not have a particularly good start. But it is interesting to compare this typically Japanese effort to smooth the road to totalitarianism with the German and Italian methods of the concentration camp and the dose of castor oil.

*Note; In May 1945, this association, Japan's nearest approach to fascism, was reported to have been dissolved--a sign that more moderate counsels were beginning to prevail. The ~~syndicalization~~ ^{syndicalization} with Hitler's fall is noteworthy.

Defense Document No. 502

(Excerpt 37, continued)

The second of the new Government's main objectives was to press forward with the plan of extricating Japan from economic dependence on the sterling and dollar areas. The fact that, before the war with China, some 80 percent of Japan's foreign trade had been with the United States and the countries of the British Empire was a matter of deep concern to the Japanese extremists. The ever-present threat of the imposition by the democracies of economic sanctions as a means of arresting Japan's aggressive advance must be removed at all costs.

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EXCERPT TAKEN FROM "BEHIND THE
JAPANESE MASK," BY RT. HON. SIR
ROBERT CRAIGIE, pages 102-105

Revised

Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 38)

In the minds of many civilian leaders the primary purpose of this Co-Prosperity scheme was economic and defensive. They argued that, but for Japan's involvement in the China war, she would by now have been able, through normal commercial and industrial processes, to secure economic predominance throughout the whole of Eastern Asia. Such a process of steady assimilation they would have much preferred to involvement in a second world war and they were therefore inclined to place the main emphasis on the need for the earliest possible conclusion of peace with China.

EXCERPT TAKEN FROM "BEHIND THE
JAPANESE MASK," BY RT HON SIR
ROBERT CRAIGIE, page 105

Rejected

辯護圖書證第五〇二號（拔萃三八）

多數ノ民間指導者ノ考ヘデハコノ共榮國ノ政策ニ關スル主要目的ハ經濟的及防衛的意圖デアツタリ彼等ハ日本ガ中國トノ戰爭ニ干與シタノハ平素ノ商業及ビ産業的手段ヲ通ジ日本ハ東亞諸國全体ノ經濟的主權ヲ握ルコトガ出來ルデアロウトノ主張シタノデアル。以上ノ如キ堅實ナ經濟的過程ガ第二次世界戰ハノ干與ニ比シヨリ好マシク思ハレタノデアル。故ニ彼等ハ出來得ル限り速ニ中國トノ間ニ和平實現ガ必須デアルト強調スル様ニナツタノデアル。

ラバート、クレギー卿著

「日本假面ノ内幕」ヨリノ拔萃

第一〇五頁

*not used**38*

Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 39)

MATSUOKA'S YEAR
(July, 1940 -- July, 1941)

* * * * *

Incidentally the whole course of this agitation for Japanese self-sufficiency presents a good example of the futility of the threat of economic sanctions as a deterrent to aggression unless it is backed by overwhelming military strength and the resolve to use that strength promptly and ruthlessly, should the need arise. In the absence of these factors, the threat in itself merely causes the potential aggressor to intensify the counter-measures necessary for securing economic self-sufficiency -- and of course these in their turn increase still further the chances of war. Nothing is more futile or dangerous than hesitation or bluff in this matter of economic sanctions.

EXCERPT TAKEN FROM "BEHIND THE
JAPANESE MASK," BY RT HON SIR
ROBERT CRICKE, pages 105-106

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Not offered - Hirota
not used

Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 40)

MIYASUOKA'S YEAR
(July, 1940--July, 1941)



We now come to the third of the new Government's main objectives, the tightening of Japan's ties with the Rome-Berlin Axis. We have seen how this project had again and again been defeated owing to the resistance, both active and passive, of the moderate elements.

EXCERPT TAKEN FROM "BEHIND THE
JAPANESE MASK," BY RT HON SIR
ROBERT C. KILGIE, page 106

not used

Def. Doc. # 502 (Excerpt 40)

松岡の年（一九四〇年七月より一九四一年七月）

我々は今新政府の主要目的の第三、即ち、ローマ、ベルリン樞軸との日本の
露がりの強化といふ所に來た。我々は、穩健派の積極的取は消極的を反
對のために、この計畫が如何に屢々挫折されて來たかを見てゐる。

ロバート・クレイギー 著

「日本の假面の陰」より抜萃

一〇六頁

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not used

Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 41)

Such was the new Minister's background. His chief outward characteristic was his extreme loquaciousness. I have never known anyone talk so much to say so little. Even at that most solemn of ceremonies, the funeral of a Japanese Imperial Prince, I could hear Matsuoka whispering to his next-door neighbour throughout the proceedings. But behind the smoke-screen of garrulousness was an acute mind and a stubborn and determined will. At the Gaimusho (Foreign Ministry) he was master in his own house to a greater extent than any of his predecessors in my time. This small, swarthy, bullet-headed man with the close-clipped moustache and the big tortoise-shell spectacles, the determined mien and the affable manner, was, I always felt, only accidentally in the militarist camp. He started his career as Foreign Minister with two main illusions. Firstly that Great Britain was beaten; secondly that the United States could be intimidated into remaining neutral in the European war.

Some of his old scores against former colleagues in the Foreign Service Matsuoka was now to pay off with interest when, in the combined role of Foreign Minister and Ali Baba, he "liquidated" no less than forty Ambassadors, Ministers and senior members of the service. The grounds for these sweeping dismissals were the alleged inefficiency of the victims and their lack of sympathy with the new foreign policy on which Japan was now to embark. But it is noteworthy that several of Mr. Matsuoka's particular bates noires were included amongst the forty.

In my first conversations with Mr. Matsuoka after his assumption of office, I spoke with a frankness which I felt was justified by our earlier acquaintanceship. I said I knew that he and the Cabinet were being pressed to throw in their lot with Germany, but that it would be the height of folly for Japan now to stake everything on a German victory. The peoples of the British Empire, backed by the powerful moral and economic support of the United States, were determined to see this thing through to a finish; if history taught one lesson conclusively it was that in the long run sustained sea power gained the victory over beleaguered land power. Japan must not be misled by Britain's temporary loss of air superiority. This would be rectified and as our air strength grew and our anti-submarine measures progressed, so the influence of British sea power would be progressively restored and would ultimately prevail. Knowing the Germans as I did, I felt sure that history would repeat itself and that Hitler would in the end blunder into war with America. With these and other similar arguments I once again sought to deter Japan from a course which, if persisted in, must one day bring her into implacable conflict with the great Western Democracies.

PURL: <http://www.legaltools.org/doc/7d7ca6/>

Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 41 - continued)

This was by no means the first time that I had warned a Japanese Foreign Minister of the folly of any link-up with the Rome-Berlin Axis. Previously my words had fallen on more fertile soil. Now the reception was different. Mr. Matsuoka admitted that decisions of great importance were imminent and agreed that the Cabinet must be placed in a position to consider the matter from every angle. But I felt for the first time that I was speaking to a Minister whose mind had been made up on this issue before he assumed office.

Whatever else may be said of Hitler's diplomacy, it must be admitted that he never failed to strike while the iron was hot. Shortly after the formation of the new Japanese Cabinet, he dispatched to Tokyo in the greatest secrecy a high official of the Berlin Foreign Office, Herr Stahmer by name (later Ambassador in Tokyo). This emissary brought with him the text of a tripartite treaty under which Japan would become a full ally of Germany and Italy. It is not known precisely what modifications were made by the Japanese Cabinet in the German draft, but it is certain Hitler did not get all he wanted at that time. Mr. Matsuoka told me he had drafted the preamble and in view of its flamboyant and mystical style, I think we may take his word for it!

On 29th September, 1940, an astonished Japan found herself definitely committed to the Axis connection. Despite the chorus of approval in the Press, widespread concern and even dissatisfaction was expressed behind closed doors. During those early days of the Pact columnists were taking the line that the alliance was merely a formality and that Japan would find ways and means of escaping involvement in the world war as a result of it. Indeed the document when published was found to contain several jokers, one of which appeared in Article 3, the main operative provision of the agreement. This stipulated that in the event of any Power not then involved in war making an attack on Germany or Italy or Japan, the other two parties would immediately give to the attacked party all the assistance in their power. Everything depended on the interpretation of the word "attack" and the Japanese Government had reserved to themselves the right of deciding upon their interpretation should their aid be invoked.

The whole agreement was of course aimed fairly and squarely at the United States. In the event of that country suddenly declaring war or making an unprovoked attack on Germany's military or naval forces, the obligation of Japan to go to Germany's aid was clear enough. But German submarines were already sinking American shipping without warning and counter-measures by the United States for the defence of her shipping could hardly be regarded as "an attack" within the meaning of the treaty. Hostilities between Germany and the United

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Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 41 - continued)

States seemed at that time more likely to develop out of the gradual intensification of Germany's ruthless and indiscriminate submarine war than from any other single cause. In that case the Japanese Government would have felt free, had they so desired, to deny that the causa fœderis had arisen. This at least was how many Japanese were arguing when the treaty first saw the light of day and at that time Mr. Matsuoka did nothing to discourage these suppositions. Only after his return from Berlin in the spring of 1941 did he take up publicly a less equivocal attitude on the point. I have reason to believe that never, up to the actual attack at Pearl Harbour, did the German Government feel sure that Japan would implement Article 3 in the sense they desired.

Amongst the Germans at this time there appears to have been two schools of thought on the subject of Japanese intervention in the war: all probably agreed that to bring Japan into war as an ally would be too expensive a luxury if it were to entail bringing the United States in on the other side; but while the majority were opposed to taking the risk, a strong minority considered isolationist opinion in the United States to be so strong that nothing but direct attack would bring America into the war. This minority view was shared by a strong section of extremist opinion in Japan which believed that the moment was now ripe for "liquidating" the British Empire in its darkest hour. Fortunately Mr. Matsuoka did not share the view of those who clamoured for immediate war against Britain, not so much because he believed at that time in the probability of American counter-intervention but because he considered a further consolidation of Japan's military and diplomatic position to be necessary before the die was cast. So the majority German view fitted in admirably with Mr. Matsuoka's and is reflected in the terms of the Pact.

Prince Konoye's opinion of the agreement may perhaps be gauged from a well-substantiated story which was current at the time. The signatories of the Pact had gathered at the Prime Minister's official residence to celebrate the occasion; champagne corks popped; jubilation was the order of the day. To everyone's concern, however, the Prince was seen to melt into tears and the party, from all accounts, was a distinct frost. This phenomenon was variously interpreted. The pro-Germans saw in these tears the very comprehensible emotion of a statesman who had at length succeeded in leading his country into the anti-capitalistic fold--what we should impolitely term the camp of the predatory Powers. But there were persistent voices

Defense Document No. 502

(Excerpt 41 - continued)

which suggested quite a different explanation; had not the Prime Minister always opposed the notion of war with the West and might not this Pact bring Japan quite a few steps nearer to that calamity? My own view is that Prince Konoye had only agreed to its signature with considerable misgiving and in order to save the country from a worse fate--that of immediate participation in the war for which so many extremists were clamouring. For the "Melancholy Prince," this Pact was probably a pis aller.

EXCERPT TAKEN FROM "BEHIND THE
JAPANESE MASK," by RT HON SIR
ROBERT CRAIGIE, pages 107-109)

Defense Document No. 502

(Excerpt 41 - continued)

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Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 58)

During the summer and autumn (1941) the food situation, which for some time had been difficult, grew steadily worse. Meat, eggs and vegetables became very scarce in the towns. The rationing system, then in its infancy, proved very inadequate and foreigners began to find it difficult to purchase enough food for bare subsistence. As for the Japanese themselves, their main trouble was the absence of sufficient Japanese-grown rice, which had to be supplemented by foreign-grown rice mixed with barley. The average Japanese does not ask much of life, but home-grown rice is to him essential and he dislikes the taste of the foreign-grown varieties. There was a certain amount of grumbling, but more often than not the man-in-the-street accepted the inefficient arrangements for the distribution of food with his usual tolerant smile.

In the Embassy we were dependent for supplies of food on the cooks who, by various occult methods and a considerable addition to the weekly books, kept us reasonably well supplied. For some two years now imported goods, whether food or clothing, had been unobtainable, so that in this respect the freezing arrangements made no appreciable difference to us. But even Japanese goods now disappeared from shops, whose empty windows presented a depressing appearance. Petrol was by now exceedingly scarce and very few private cars were seen in circulation. The Embassy cars were only kept going because we had looked ahead and purchased a sizeable stock of petrol while it was still legal to do so.

As regards trade and industry, there is no doubt that the sudden loss of virtually all Japan's markets outside Eastern Asia and the cutting off of Japan's essential supplies of war materials had had a catastrophic effect. Reports came in of factories engaged in light industry closing down all over the country, the workmen being transferred to munitions and to heavy industry generally. The stocks of raw materials for the munition industries, accumulated for years under the control of the Army and Navy, now began to be drawn upon.



Defense Document No. 502
(Excerpt 58 - continued)

It was clear that Japan must either reach some compromise with the Western Powers, which would mean putting her whole policy of southward expansion into reverse, or she must go out and seize on foreign territory the additional raw materials she required. Hard experience was showing that economic sanctions can only be successfully applied to a strong and resolute Power if the combined strength of the nations applying the sanctions is so overwhelming as to leave the aggressor no alternative but to capitulate. Would Japan now consider that the total naval and military strength arrayed against her was sufficiently great to necessitate a retreat from China? I was myself certain that the answer to this question was in the negative, Indo-China, yes--but China, no.

EXCERPT TAKEN FROM "BEHIND THE
JAPANESE MIND," BY RE MON SIR
RICHARD CRAIGIE, pages 126-127


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辯護圖書類第五〇二

(抜萃五八)

一九四一年の夏から秋にかけて、それまでも窮屈だつた食糧事情はじりじりと悪化してきた。肉類、卵、野菜類が都會では非常に乏しくなり、當時まだ誕生して間もない配給制度は夫いに不適切なものであることが解り、外國人はたゞ生存のための食糧さへ充分に買ひ入れることが難しくなつた。日本人自身について言へば、その悩みの主なるものは日本産の米が充分にないことと、その分は外米を大麥に混ぜて、補ひをつけなければならなかつた。日本人は普通、生活から多くを要求することはしないのだが、國內産の米は、日本人にとつて無くてはならぬものであり、日本人は、外米の味が嫌ひだ。或る程度の不平もあつたが、食糧配給のその非能率的な手筈についても大抵の場合市井の人々はいつもの寛大な微笑を以て容認してゐた。

大使館では食糧の供給は料理人たちに任せきりであつたが、彼等は言々に分らぬやりくりによつたり毎週の帳簿にかなりの追加をしたりして、相當良いものを供給してくれた。二年程前から輸入品は、食糧とい



はず衣類といはず手に入らなくなつてゐたので、この點については、凍結措^{ちく}のため、われわれが目に見える程の相違を感じずるやうなことはなかつた。併し今や日本の商品さへ商品から姿を消し、空になつたショウウインドウが氣の滅入るやうな有様を呈してゐた。その頃までには、ガソリンもひどく乏しくなり自家用車で走つてゐるものはほんの僅かしが見られなかつたが、見通しをつけてかなりのガソリンのストックをまだ合法的に買へる間に買入れて置いたので、どうやらわれわれ大使館の自動車は走れるやうになつてゐた。

貿易と産業とに關しては實質的には東アジア以外にある、日本の諸市場を全部不意に受つたことと日本の必需戦争資材の供給を絶たれたことが悲劇的な影響を與へてゐることは疑ひない。輕工業に従事してゐた諸工場が全国至る所で閉鎖し、そのため労働者は、軍需産業及び廣く重工業方面に移されてゐるといふ情報が入つてゐる。數年來陸海軍の管理の下に蓄積されてきた軍需産業用諸原料のストックが今や使はれはじめたのである。

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日本は西方諸國と何らか妥協を講ずるか、是はとりもなほさず其の南方伸張政策を一切放棄することを意味するのだが――さもなければ、國外に出て、その必要とする諸原料の不足分を外國領土より獲得すかの孰れかであることは明瞭であつた。強力且斷乎決意せる國家に對する經濟制裁の適用も、適用する諸國家の聯合勢力が壓倒的であつて侵略國としては陸伏する以外に道のない場合に限り、成功するものであることは昔い經驗に徴して明らかである。日本は現在果して、對日陸海軍全勢力を以て、日本の支那からの退却を余儀なくするに足る程大なりと考へるであらうか？ 私自身としては本問題に對する回答は必ずや否定的、即ち佛印よりの撤退は認めるにしても、支那よりは一步も退くまいと云ふに相違ないことを確信してゐた。

リチャードクレイギー卿著 “日本人の後面に隠れたるもの” よりの抜粹
一二六一―一二七頁より